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Congress and the Courts
By Carl McGowan*

It is very pleasing to be back in the atmosphere of the University of Chicago Law School.
Although I cannot claim the status of an alumnus, my associations with the School are many.
They go back to 1939 when I first came to this
City to teach at Northwestern Law School-an
institution for which I also have lasting respect
and affection. There was then in existence a most
amiable custom whereby the law faculties of the
two universities met together twice a year, once
on the South Side and once on the North, to
dine together and to engage, in the happy phrase
used by the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, in "social and fraternal exchanges."
It was by this means that I first got to know the
University of Chicago law faculty, and particularly some of the younger members who were
just beginning the brilliant careers that have
meant so much to all of you, to the University,
and now to the nation.
Although Pearl Harbor brought those highly
civilized occasions to an end, the friendships so
made I managed to keep green in one way or
another, and they were actively resumed in my
post-war incarnations in Chicago. During the
1950's I was even privileged to teach some seminars at the Law School, which possibly some of
you here may have endured and survived with
no permanent injury to your professional competence.
On the social side, one of the heavier costs of
my entry into the federal judicial system was the
*judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia. Address given
at the University of Chicago Law School Annual Dinner. April 17,
1975.
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geographical harrier interposed to the continued
enjoyment by my wife and myself of our frequent
visits to the University area. For the intellectual
stimulation and congenial discourse so provided,
Washington, I assure you, provides no really
comparable substitute, despite its earnest pretensions to being a latter-day Athens. Milder
winters and fleetingly newsworthy names have
little to do with the life of the mind, or, indeed,
with such essential enterprises as educating the
young and providing clients with decent professional services.
Fortunately my trade has provided me with
one means of keeping in touch with the Law
School. Periodically I am favored with one of its
new graduates as a law clerk: Donald Glaves,
who helped me through the first traumatic
months of the switch from advocacy to decisionmaking, Milton Schroeder, George Ranney, Douglas Ginsburg, and presently, Bill Block.
For the coming year, there is Gene Comey who,
so I read recently in the New York Times, appears to entertain the antiquated idea that grades
have something to do with capacity. He does not
realize, I guess, that I hired him solely because
of his bright blue eyes. Gene's colleague with me
next year also brings the stamp of the Midway,
although he pursued his higher education at Harvard-possibly because, after prolonged and close
exposure to revealed truth from one source, he
wanted to hear how it was at another knee. His
name is Meltzer.
I hope I may associate myself with all of you
in tribute to your retiring Dean. I first got to
know Phil in 1954 when, lately returned to practice from the public trough and not oppressed by
clients, I spent the summer quarter on the law
faculty at Stanford. I was impressed with him
then, as I have continued to become more impressed throughout the succeeding years. His is
one of those keen and rational legal minds that
can invariably illuminate any problem-legal or
otherwise. I was greatly grieved that I left Chicago not long after lie arrived. But I have fol4

lowed his career here with interest and admiration, and I am sure that his contributions to the
Law School and to legal scholarship will redouble
as he rejoins the ranks.
The Law School will, I have no doubt, prosper
under the new leadership as it has so mightily
under the old. My only concern for it derives
from the cloud on the horizon vividly described
by Walter Blum in his recent reflections on the
new consumerism. You have undoubtedly shuddered, as have I, in your reading of his occasional paper on this subject. Class actions by law
classes for eccentric teaching; defective legal research publications called back for repairs; damages sought from the Law School by dissatisfied
clients for professional incompetence lurking behind the J.D. degree-all these and kindred horrors diverting the time of the faculty from teaching and research to defending themselves in court,
and inevitably cliilling imaginativeness in method
and unorthodoxy in analysis. And, if practitioners must continuously go back to school, as Minnesota and other states are beginning to require
and the bar associations to accept, why not the
law professors? And who will there be to teach
them, when they go?
Of course what really disturbs me about Walter's piece are its implications for the judiciary,
as lie darkly speculates about the recall of judicial opinions along with academic treatises. Have
the courts with their progressive weakening of
sovereign immunity and executive privilege left
themselves naked to profane invasion of the sacred temple of judicial immunity?
At least the medical men, bereft as they very
nearly are of the availability of malpractice insurance, will view such a desecration with sardonic satisfaction. The only cheering thought
that comes to mind is that, since the courts have
embraced the new consumerism so enthusiastically in other contexts, surely the beneficiaries
of it will, in their own self-interest, be alert to
spare the goose that has laid so many golden
eggs.
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I had thought to talk with you for a few minutes tonight about a subject which has come to
interest me greatly after twelve years on the
bench. That is the current relationship between
the Congress and the federal judicial system. It
happens, I believe, to be relevant to the new consumerism, because Congress is fast becoming our
biggest consumer. Indeed, it threatens to consume
us utterly. On one aspect of that relationship I
content myself with noting that, unlike other
consumers, Congress is in the uniquely happy
position of being able to freeze the price of the
judicial services required by it. In that one respect at any rate, it has been able to whip inflation now. My concern is, rather, with the more
significant question of the allocation of tasks by
the Congress to the federal courts-their extent,
their nature, and what they portend for the
future.
As most of you need no telling, the business of
the federal courts, with the exception of the original juristliction reposed in the Supreme Court
by the Constitution, depends upon the affirmative action of Congress. Indeed, the lower federal
courts exist only by virtue of such action, as does
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The business they do is limited to what Congress
authorizes and directs. What they have in fact
been given to do has varied greatly since the
First Judiciary Act of 1789, but the trend has
been unmistakably, and now overwhelmingly,
towards enlargement.
At the present time that trend is vastly accelerating, as I can readily see when I compare
the way I spend my working day when I first
entered the system with what I am doing now.
My own court has increasingly become a court
preoccupied with civil litigation involving the
federal government. During the last fiscal year,
appeals of this nature constituted two-thirds of
our business. They will soon become, I believe,
over 90% of the total.
Paralleling the growth in the numbers of these
appeals is an observable change in their nature6

and in their novelty, complexity and difficulty.
And in their interest as well, perhaps I should
add, at least for any one with a fascination for the
strange and wondrous workings of the far-flung
federal establishment in both its executive and
legislative embodiments.
. This has all been due to a number of things.
One is chargeable to the courts themselves. Progressive relaxation of judicially created requirements of standing has enabled almost any person
to get into court to complain about almost any
act, or omission to act, of the executive branch
and the independent agencies. But the capacity
of the courts to reverse that relaxation is now being impaired by a spectacularly increasing tendency on the part of the Congress to provide
explicitly for federal court remedies and judicial
review in every new federal statute.
This trend was impressively described and documented by Henry Friendly in his Carpentier
Lectures at Columbia in 1972. If you think Congress has heeded that or similar warnings, I can
supply you with a long list of statutes enacted
since that time indicating that the current Congressional love affair with federal jurisdiction is
heating up rather than cooling.
There recently became effective the Social Services Amendments of 1974, providing for civil actions in the federal district courts to enforce state
child support orders upon certification by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. A
few weeks earlier the President signed the Safe
Drinking Water Act of 1974 which, after taking
a deep breath, provides for (1) civil actions by
the Administrator to require compliance, (2)
civil penalties, fines, and injunctive relief for
failure to obtain permits, (3) exclusive review in
my court of regulations promulgated under certain sections of the Act, and in other specified
courts of appeals, of regulations under other sections, (4) district court review of actions concerning variances or exemptions, and (5) civil actions
by citizens in the district court without limitation
as to the amount in controversy. The Endan7

gered Species Act of 1973 also provides for citi.
zens' suits in the district court without regard to
jurisdictional amount; and the Older Americans
Comprehensive Services Amendments of 1973
puts in the federal courts of appeals mandatory
jurisdiction of appeals by states from the Commissioners' actions. And these are but a handful
of the newer jurisdictional grants, many of which
deal with infinitely more complex, if indeed not
more important, subjects.
The pattern taking shape appears to be that of
a Congress intent upon bringing federal power
to bear in an ever-widening range of human affairs, but having no better answer for the monitoring, supervision, and enforcement of that
power than the employment of the federal courts
to these ends. That is conceivably one way to
govern the country, and perhaps we of the federal courts should be flattered by this seeming
mark of confidence in our capacities. I suggest,
however, that it was not in this way, or by such
heavy involvement in tasks of this nature, that
the federal courts achieved such prestige and
popular acceptance as they may now enjoy.
That prestige, in my submission, can only suffer if the federal courts are made to carry too
active a role in what is surely in large part simply
day-to-day public administration. It was in a
similar context that Governor Charles Evans
Hughes of New York in 1907, fighting against
crippling judicial review additions to his bill for
a public utilities commission, made his famous
statement, often quoted in apparent ignorance
of the circumstances in which it was made, that
"We are tinder a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is, and the judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty and property
tinder the Constitution ... Let us keep the courts
(said the embryo Chief Justice) for the questions
they were intended to consider."
I am reminded in this regard of the deathless,
and wholly revealing, defense offered last week
by a high federal officer to the charge that the air
lift of orphans from Vietnam had been poorly
8

organized and executed. "I am not," he said, as
quoted in the New York Times, "an expert. I
am an administrator."
The current Congressional involvements of the
federal courts in public affairs does not stop with
their immersion in administration. It extends to
the legislative process itself. A recurring phenomenon is for the legislative branch, in address.
ing itself to major areas of public concern, to
finesse hard choices of policy, likely to tie up
elected legislators representing differing interests
in knots of controversy and resulting inaction.
Instead, it makes broad delegations of authority
to department heads or newly-created commissions to make those choices in the form of implementing regulations. In order to assure that such
regulations are carefully scrutinized for conformity to the dimly ascertainable Congressional
intentions, judicial review is provided by refer.
ence to variously articulated standards such as
arbitrariness, rational basis, or, God help us,
substantial evidentiary support in the record.
When that record is one made in informal rule
making, it is indistinguishable in its content from
the proceedings before a legislative committee
hearing on a proposed bill, consisting as it does
of letters, telegrams, and written statements from
proponents and opponents, including occasional
oral testimony not subjected to adversary crossexamination. It is on that kind of a record that
a Congressman decides which way to vote on a
bill, if indeed he is one of those who tries conscientiously to inform himself of anything other
than the relative political weight of the lobbies
at work. The resulting policy choices, when reflected in the statutes themselves, are virtually
immune to judicial scrutiny except as constitutional barriers are transgressed. As Justice Bran.
(leis said long ago, speaking for his Court, when
dealing with statutes directly, courts presume
that facts exist supportive of them.
The point I am making is, thus, obvious.
When, by Congressional delegation tantamount
to abdication, the policy choices are largely con9

fined to agency rule making, the record before
the reviewing court is essentially the same. No
matter how the standard of review is articulated,
there is great latitude for the judge to vote his
policy views in the same manner as does the
legislator. No matter how sensible of the necessity for restraint by a life-time judge not accountable to the electorate, the opportunities,
and the consequent temptations, are great to
come down on the side of the judge's personal
conceptions of policy. Even the humblest judge
-and the most alert to the dangers of result.
oriented adjudication-may slip, sometimes subconsciously, if his predilections are sufficiently
engaged, and thereby risk nullification of the
principle that democracies are to be run in accordance with the majority will.
It is one thing for a federal judge to sit in
judgment upon an order of the National Labor
Relations Board, or of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, made in an adjudicated case upon a
record compiled in adversary proceedings under
statutes concretely formulating legislative policy
choices. It is quite another where the court is
called upon to review regulations made in rule
making by an agency to which Congress has made
a sweepingly broad delegation of power to put
flesh on the bare bones of precatory prescriptions that there shall be cleaner air and unpolluted waters, or greater product safety, or no
discrimination in employment, or working conditions less hazardous to health or safety, or greater
conservation of energy.
This is a new kind of regulatory control which,
as Professor Murray Weidenbaum of Washington University has recently pointed out, departs
widely from the older and more familiar model.
The supervisory agency has no responsibility for
the particular industry as a whole in its impact
upon the public. The focus is rather upon a single aspect of its activities to the exclusion of
everything else. Necessary as the new model may
be thought to be, the problems inherent in it
are not lessened by the second guessing of judges
I)

ill-equipped by training or experience to make
the judgments appropriate only for the elected
representatives of the people.
If federal judges presently hold a great potential of power to impose their views upon many
aspects of the modern economy, it is surely the
Congress that has made them so by its penchant
for combining broad delegation of law-making
authority with sweeping, albeit inexpertly conceived, provisions for judicial review. In any
event, my immediate concern is less with the implications of that approach for the philosophical
underpinnings of our democracy than with its
effect in adding new grist for the mills of an already over-taxed federal court system.
The prospect presently faced by the federal
courts is that of a Congress always adding to their
jurisdiction, but never taking anything away.
This is accompanied by a seeming indifference,
as Chief justice Burger so justly complains, to
the necessity of providing increased resources to
enable the courts to cope with the rising tide. An
example of this blithe approach is the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act of 1973-the statute
passed on an emergency basis to try to keep the
bankrupt eastern railroads running until they
could be reorganized on a unified basis. That Act
created a special three-judge district court to
serve in effect as the reorganization court for
seven railroads, including the Penn Central, on
a very tight statutory time-table in which to get
its work clone.
But no provision was made for additional ju.
dicial manpower or even any funds for supporting staff or other purposes. The system was
somehow, presumably, supposed to absorb this
additional task within its present capabilities. I
serve on that court, on top of my regular duties,
along with Henry Friendly and Judge Roszel
Thomsen of Baltimore. So far it has cost me
much of my single summer holiday; my unreimbursed expenses of being present at the hearings: and, very nearly, my wife.
At the same time, Congress seems unable to
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move on the pending suggestions to reduce the
jurisdiction of the federal courts and to
rationalize the means by which it is exercised.
The American Law Institute's modest proposals
for a more rational allocation of jurisdiction between the state and federal courts principally involve not a complete abolition of diversity jurisdiction as should be done, but only closing the
federal courts to resident plaintiffs. They have
not been able in five years to reach the stage of
final committee consideration. In this instance I
feel bound to add that the inertia of Congress
is almost entirely attributable to a conspiracy of
silence by the practicing bar. The politically sensitive legislators correctly interpret that silence
as opposition, albeit one that must be largely
covert because it cannot counter logically the
reasonableness of the change.
The Freund Committee's recommendation that
three-judge district courts be ended, which has
been acclaimed on all sides as a very useful step
in reducing both jurisdictional confusion and
administrative strain, remains, in its major aspects, blocked by the opposition of a single minority group. The facts of life are that, with the
average voter's understandable indifference to
the intricacies of federal jurisdiction, the federal
courts, with no lobby going for them, are vulnerable to any single special interest possessing
some capacity, however slight, to punish at the
polls.
What Congress was able to pass at the last
session with no difficulty at all was a statute on
judicial conflicts of interest-a subject which has
about as low a priority as one can imagine, in
view of the comprehensive Canons of Judicial
Ethics proposed by the American Bar Association and embraced by the Judicial Conference of
the United States as controlling upon federal
judges. Apparently the Congressmen simply
could not resist getting into that act.
Their other legislative achievement was to impose on the already struggling federal courts a
rigid schedule for the disposition of federal crim12

inal cases, and that at a time when the federal
courts have been moving mightily and with visible success to bring this problem under control
despite the dramatic increase in federal criminal
prosecutions. No thought, of course, was taken
as to how the courts could meet the new requirements without a substantial increase in judicial
resources. Nor has any action been taken on the
sweeping revision of the federal criminal code,
including the elimination of a lot of offenses
which do not require the exertion of federal
power, proposed by a presidential commission a
few years ago.
Meanwhile, there are to be seen in the burgeoning ranks of our litigants some new facesthose of the Congressmen themselves. With the
decline of standing requirements, and the expansion of judicial remedies and review, a growing number of legislators have awakened to the
political advantages of going to court to challenge executive, agency, and even legislative, action. This attracts publicity, and is likely to be
popular with the constituents. It has few, if any,
drawbacks, especially if there are pro bono groups
or private law firms available, as they appear to
be, to provide the legal representation.
I do not say that this is an undesirable development, but there may be implications of it not
yet thought througlh with sufficient care. It might,
for example, be unhealthy if the federal courts
come to be regarded as a higher chamber where
a legislator, who has failed to persuade his colleagues of the demerits of a particular bill, can
always renew the battle. And some might conceivably think that, in certain contexts, free legal
services, if such there be, are perhaps indistinguishable in substance and effect from political
contributions. In any event, this is one area in
which the legislators are direct consumers of our
product, and consumers peculiarly situated to do
something about it if they are not satisfied.
The federal courts in Washington, because
they are where they are, are undoubtedly more
caught up in what I call, for want of a better
13

word, public interest or public affairs litigation.
But we are not alone among the circuits in this
respect; and, if what I see happening in our
court is any guide, then it may be that private
civil litigation is in for some hard times. Already it is at least arguable that A who sues B to
enforce a contract, or to assert a tort or fraud
liability, is getting lost in the shuffle. He may,
indeed, be regarded at worst as a positive nuisance, or, at best, as a minor distraction of the
court from the pressing public business at hand.
It has long been an article of faith, as Professor Harry Jones of Columbia Law School recently reminds us in his excellent initiation of
the John Dewey Lectures on Legal Philosophyhonoring a name closely associated with your
own University-that one of the great ends served
by law and the courts is "the authoritative settlement of disputes between individuals and between individual citizens and the state." In my
own observation, it is that latter aspect that is
preempting the time of the federal courts, and
very possibly to the subordination of the former.
Perhaps this was inevitable from the day we
rejected the parliamentary system, electing to live
under a written Constitution in which power is
dispersed between three separate branches of
government, and with one of those branches
having, thanks to John Marshall, the authority
to examine the actions of the other two by reference to that Constitution. Our revolutionary
origins may explain why, in enacting a federal
system, we tacitly accorded a primacy and priority
to the individual's right to complain about his
government over his grievance against his neighbor. Our colonial forebears may very likely have
felt that they could usually handle their neighbors by themselves, but that standing up to
George the Third called for something more than
self-help.
However this may be, the preoccupation of federal jurisdiction with that primacy is large and
growing, with inescapably adverse impact upon
the handling by federal courts of purely private
14

litigation. This is something which, if I am right,
the practicing bar must take into account in its
own interest. Perhaps it may even decide that it
has nothing to lose by speaking up on the subject of diversity jurisdiction.
The judiciary-at both the state and federal
levels-is an institution I have always believed
to be of critical importance to our national well.
being. As the time approaches to hand along my
very small piece of the torch, my concern is that
the flame be not dimmed by either neglect, or a
too expansive concept of how far its light can
reach.
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